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FULFILLING THE PROMISE?:  
WHEN HUMANITARIAN OBLIGATIONS 
AND FOREIGN POLICY GOALS CONFLICT 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
Eleanor E. Downes* 
SEEKING REFUGE: CENTRAL AMERICAN MIGRATION TO MEXCO, 
THE UNITED STATES, AND CANADA. By María Cristina García. Berke-
ley: University of California Press. 2006. Pp. 289. 
 
Abstract: In Seeking Refuge: Central American Migration to Mexico, the United 
States, and Canada, María Cristina García evaluates the United States’ re-
sponse to political and military upheavals in Central America in the 
1980s. García explains that both international and domestic law de-
manded that the United States provide refugee status to individuals with a 
“well-founded fear of persecution.” She suggests that, because it played a 
significant role in creating these refugees, the United States had an even 
greater responsibility to provide for their refuge. This Book Review evalu-
ates the failure of U.S. law and policy to realize even the minimal stan-
dards established under international agreements with regard to the pro-
tection of refugees. In examining the situations in Central America in the 
1980s and Iraq now, it concludes that the United States must fulfill its ob-
ligations under international law without regard to whether the United 
States contributed to the refugee-creating crisis. 
Introduction 
 The 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (1951 Convention), the fundamental international agree-
ment regarding refugees, defines a refugee as a person who “owing to 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, na-
tionality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, 
is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.”1 Be-
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2006–2007). 
1 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art.1, opened for signature July 28, 
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, available at http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2 
aa10. pdf [hereinafter 1951 Convention]. The 1951 Convention “provides the most com-
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tween 1974 and 1996 millions of Central Americans were driven from 
their homes by military forces that used violence to terrorize and incite 
fear among civilians.2 Similarly, since the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 
2003, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have sought refuge throughout 
the world in an effort to save themselves from violence and persecu-
tion.3 In both situations, U.S. foreign policy contributed to the violent 
persecution of innocent civilians that in turn drove thousands from 
their homes.4 Whether these migrants have been recognized as refu-
gees has depended upon the formal and informal immigration, refu-
gee, and foreign policies of the country where they sought safety.5 
 In her book, Seeking Refuge: Central American Migration to Mexico, the 
United States, and Canada, María Cristina García explores the causes and 
effects of mass migration from Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala 
to North America during the 1980s and, in doing so, asserts that the 
United States failed to fulfill its obligation to respond to the needs of 
millions.6 García begins by providing a brief history of the political up-
heavals and wars in these three Central American countries.7 She de-
tails the economic and political sources of struggle and identifies the 
role the United States played in exacerbating each of these crises.8 By 
                                                                                                                      
prehensive codification of the rights of refugees yet attempted on the international level.” 
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Intro. to Convention and Protocol Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees 5 (UNHCR/MRPI/C.1CONV&PRO/ENG/OCTOBER 
2006) (2006), available at http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf 
[hereinafter UNHCR, Intro. to Convention & Protocol] (unofficial introduction to 
1951 Convention, supra). 
2 María Cristina García, Seeking Refuge: Central American Migration to Mex-
ico, the United States, and Canada 31–32 (2006). 
3 Sabrina Tavernise, The Struggle for Iraq: Refugees; for Iraqis, Exodus to Syria and Jordan Con-
tinues, N.Y. Times, June 14, 2006, at A15; UNHCR, Field Info. and Coordination Support 
Section, Div. of Operational Serv., 2005 Global Refugee Trends: Statistical Overview of Populations 
of Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Internally Displaced Persons, Stateless Persons, and Other Persons of Con-
cern to UNHCR, tbl.2 ( June 9, 2006), available at http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/ STATIS- 
TICS/4486ceb12.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR, Global Refugee Trends]. 
4 See García, supra note 2, at 1, 13; Tavernise, supra note 3. The president of the non-
governmental group, the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, Lavinia Limon, 
has stated that the nearly 900,000 Iraqis who left Iraq between 2003 and 2005 are “the 
biggest new flow of refugees in the world.” See Tavernise, supra note 3. 
5 García, supra note 2, at 32–33. 
6 Id. at 1–2. 
7 Id. at 14–43. 
8 See id. From 1934 until 1977, the United States provided financial and military support 
to the ruling Somoza family in Nicaragua; this aid secured the loyalty of Nicaragua against 
Communist forces during the early Cold War. See id. at 13–14. In the early 1970s, the United 
States supported the Somoza’s containment of the Sandinista National Liberation Front 
(FSLN) that advocated revolutionary political and socioeconomic changes. Id. at 14, 15. The 
FSLN increasingly took control away from the Somoza dictatorship. Id. at 15. Their revolu-
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ignoring human rights abuses and providing aid to military regimes 
known to be committing human rights abuses, the United States at-
tempted to secure the loyalty of changing regimes and to contain the 
spread of Communism.9 The results of war and upheaval in Nicaragua, 
El Salvador, and Guatemala were immense.10 Between 1974 and 1996, 
approximately 250,000 people were killed, 1,000,000 were displaced 
within their home countries, and 2,000,000 fled Central America to 
                                                                                                                      
tionary efforts were eventually supported by the United States when President Jimmy Carter 
announced, in 1977, that the United States would withdraw economic and military support 
from Latin American countries whose human rights policies did not meet U.S. expectations. 
Id. at 17. The United States quickly recognized the FSLN government and for approximately 
two years provided copious aid in hopes that the Sandinistas would provide peace and secu-
rity for Nicaragua. Id. Toward the end of President Carter’s administration, the United States 
began covertly supporting anti-Sandinista organizations and canceling promised aid. See id. at 
18. President Reagan’s administration further advanced the anti-Sandinista opposition by 
placing a trade embargo on Nicaragua and supporting the contra-revolucionarios (Contras) in 
stopping the flow of arms to a leftist revolutionary group in El Salvador. See id. The first Bush 
administration continued policies that undermined the Sandinistas and provided a great 
deal of support to opposition parties during the 1989 election. Id. at 20. This support con-
tributed to the election of Violeta Barrios de Chamorro who represented a coalition of four-
teen opposition parties. Id. In 1990, the United States lifted the trade embargo and provided 
aid to this newly elected coalition government. Id. 
Beginning in 1932, El Salvador was ruled by generals with connections to fourteen 
dominant families that controlled over sixty percent of the farm land in the nation. Id. By 
the 1960s, unequal power and resource distribution led to the development of civil dis-
obedience and the Catholic Church’s advocacy of a “theology of liberation.” See id. at 21. A 
military-civilian junta overthrew the existing government in 1979; it and the three other 
juntas that took over between 1979 and 1982 failed to enact reform measures. Id. at 22. 
Neither President Carter’s 1977 declaration that aid to Latin American countries would be 
dependent on respect for human rights nor the killing of over 13,000 civilians in 1981 had 
a significant effect on military or economic aid to the Salvadoran government. See id. at 24. 
In fact, the United States provided $6 billion of aid over a twelve year period. See id. at 25–
26; see also Gregory L. Smith, Immune to Truth? Latin American Truth Commissions and U.S. 
Support for Abusive Regimes, 33 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 241, 257 (2001) (explaining that 
truth commissions have failed to consider the role of the United States in the perpetration 
of human rights abuses). 
In 1954, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency assisted in a military coup that over-
threw a democratically elected government in Guatemala. García, supra note 2, at 26. 
Over the forty years that followed, military rulers received substantial support from the 
United States in the form of military training, corporate investment, and development aid. 
See id. at 26, 29. This assistance continued essentially undisrupted despite rampant human 
rights abuses including religious and cultural persecution and the murder and “disappear-
ance” of hundreds of thousands of citizens. See id. at 26–29; Smith, supra, at 261. García 
quotes President Reagan as having said that General Efraín Ríos Montt of Guatemala “was 
a man of ‘great personal integrity’ whom human rights monitors had given a ‘bum rap.’” 
García, supra note 2, at 29. President Reagan made this comment in 1982, the same year 
in which, on a single day, 500 Guatemalan army forces entered a small village and mur-
dered 350 civilians. See id. at 28, 29. 
9 See García, supra note 2, at 13–29. 
10 See id. at 1. 
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find refuge.11 Most of these migrants sought refuge in Mexico, Canada 
and the United States; however, the policies of these North American 
countries generally reflected a prioritization of state interests over hu-
manitarian obligations.12 In contrast with its neighbors that were not 
involved in the military conflicts of Central America, the United States, 
which was intricately involved in supporting at least one side of each 
country’s war,13 was “reluctant to admit that its policies caused dis-
placement and generated refugees.”14 
 The hesitance of the United States to take responsibility for its role 
in creating Central American refugees was accompanied by a reluctance 
to fully address the needs of those seeking refuge.15 García introduces 
her book by arguing that although “foreign policy decisions often cause 
the displacement of populations, migration should not be used as an 
instrument for undermining or bolstering a specific regime.”16 Later, 
she echoes the argument of many U.S. citizens and the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) that the United States had 
                                                                                                                      
11 Id. 
12 See id. While García fully explores the policies of Mexico and Canada, this Book Re-
view focuses on her analysis of the U.S. handling of Central American migration. Canadian 
and Mexican refugee and immigration policies, while far from flawless in the 1980s, were 
more generous than that of the United States. See id. at 77, 119. Both Canada and Mexico 
approached the conflicts in Central America as domestic issues with which they intention-
ally avoided interference. Id. at 125. As such, their immigration and refugee policies bore 
little connection to their foreign policies of non-involvement; both nations adopted more 
generous and adaptive approaches to Central American migrants than did the United 
States. See id. at 77, 119, 125. Furthermore, Mexico was not a signatory to the 1951 Conven-
tion or the 1967 Protocol until 2000, and was therefore in no way legally obligated to ac-
cept refugees during the period García discusses. See id. at 46; UNHCR, States Parties to the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, 3, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2007) 
[hereinafter UNHCR, Parties to Convention]. Canada signed the 1951 Convention and the 
1967 Protocol in 1969. UNHCR, Parties to Convention, supra, at 2. 
13See García, supra note 2, at 18, 24, 26. In the span of three years, the United States 
provided substantial support to three opposing groups within Nicaragua. See id. at 17–19. 
14 See id. at 33. García quotes a Salvadoran immigrant explaining the reluctance of the 
United States to accept Central Americans as refugees despite their need for humanitarian 
relief: 
“The Reagan Administration doesn’t want to accept us as refugees because it 
would be admitting that the military aid it sends to El Salvador does not help, 
rather destroys and creates refugees. I didn’t come here because I wanted to. 
I had no economic need to come. I left my country because I had to.” 
Id. at 84. 
15 See id. at 86. In 1981, the UNHCR accused the United States of failing to fulfill its 
obligations towards refugees when it routinely forced Salvadoran refugees to return to 
their country. Id. at 89. 
16 Id. at 8. 
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a responsibility, beyond that codified in the 1951 Convention, towards 
Central American migrants because of its role in instigating the condi-
tions that led them to flee their home countries.17 According to this per-
spective, the United States should have liberally granted refugee assis-
tance in order to account for its foreign policy decisions.18 
 This Book Review argues that while the responsibility of the 
United States to provide humanitarian relief and refugee status is clear 
under international and domestic law, inferring additional responsibili-
ties based on foreign policy unnecessarily creates the risk that humani-
tarian relief will become a tool of foreign policy and as such will fail to 
serve the human need it is intended to address. Part I provides an 
analysis of international refugee standards and explores how U.S. poli-
cies towards Central American migrants from 1974 to 1996 failed to 
meet the obligations imposed by those standards. Part II analogizes the 
political upheaval, war, and migration from Central America in the 
1980s to the current political, military, and migration crises in Iraq. 
Part III argues that the United States should fulfill its current interna-
tional obligations by addressing the humanitarian needs of Iraqi refu-
gees without allowing those needs to be politicized. 
I. Making and Bending Refugee Standards 
A. Well-Founded International Standards for Refugees 
 Following the Second World War, the newly formed United Na-
tions adopted standards for the protection of refugees based on an un-
derlying assumption that “human beings shall enjoy fundamental rights 
and freedoms without discrimination,” and that these rights could not 
be adequately protected “without international co-operation.”19 While 
the 1951 Convention continues to be the foundational international 
statement on refugees, the UNHCR has refined the evolving concept of 
refugees and their rights through formally adopted protocols and ad-
ministrative handbooks.20 
                                                                                                                      
17 Id. at 92. 
18 García, supra note 2, at 86, 92. 
19 1951 Convention, supra note 1, pmbl. The 1951 Convention was not the first inter-
national effort to codify refugee policies. See id. art. 1. Article I notes five pre-WWII at-
tempts to define refugees and their rights. See id. 
20 See, e.g., U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 
19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, available at http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/ 
3b66c2aa10.pdf [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]; UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria 
for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
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 The 1951 Convention defines the qualifications for refugee status, 
the duties of States that ratify the agreement, and the rights to which 
refugees are entitled.21 The 1951 Convention definition of a refugee 
includes a person with a well-founded fear of persecution based on per-
sonal identity traits or membership in particular groups based on 
events prior to January 1, 1951.22 It excludes any person for whom 
there are reasonable grounds for believing may have “committed a 
crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity,” “com-
mitted a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge,” or 
“been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the 
United Nations.”23 Under the 1951 Convention, refugees’ rights re-
garding freedom of religion, freedom of association, ownership of real 
and intellectual property, and access to courts are protected.24 Refugees 
are assured of the right to wage-earning employment, rations when the 
host State’s population is entitled to them, access to housing on par 
with other non-citizens, public education, and public relief.25 Further-
more, States agree to allow refugees to choose a place of residence and 
                                                                                                                      
Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/Eng/4/Rev.1 ( Jan. 1992); UNHCR, UNHCR Advisory 
Regarding the Return of Iraqis (Sept. 2005), http://www.unhcr.org/news/NEWS/43395ed34. 
html (follow “UNHCR Advisory Regarding the Return of Iraqis” hyperlink). 
21 1951 Convention, supra note 1. The 1951 Convention should be distinguished from 
other foundational documents of the United Nations that did not bind States to specific 
obligations. See, e.g., Eleanor Roosevelt, Chairperson of the United Nations Comm’n on 
Human Rights, Adoption of the Declaration of Human Rights (1948), available at http:// 
www.udhr.org/history/ergeas48.htm. For example, by supporting the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights in 1948, countries pledged themselves to a “common standard of 
achievement” but did not become parties to an international agreement or accept any 
legal obligation. See id. In contrast, the 1951 Convention is an international agreement 
under which States accept specific obligations. See 1951 Convention, supra note 1, pmbl. 
22 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. 1. The “well-founded fear of persecution” is a 
key phrase of the definition. UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining 
Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
supra note 20, at ¶ 37. The particular context of WWII, in which horrifying numbers of 
people were persecuted, murdered, and driven from their homes because of their race, 
religion, nationality, membership in particular social groups, and political opinion, shaped 
the post-war understanding of refugees and thus the 1951 Convention’s definition. See 
Matthew E. Price, Persecution Complex: Justifying Asylum Law’s Preference for Persecuted People, 
47 Harv. Int’l L.J. 413, 419 (2006). As a result of this historic focus on persecution of 
specific groups, “people caught in the crossfire of civil war or generalized violence, starv-
ing people, people without the economic resources to subsist, people forced to flee their 
countries due to environmental catastrophe, people forcibly recruited by a rebel militia, 
and battered women unable to obtain protection from the police” have often been ex-
cluded from the benefits of refugee status. See id. at 417. 
23 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. 1. 
24 Id. arts. 4, 13–16. 
25 Id. arts. 17, 20–23. 
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to move freely within their territories.26 The 1951 Convention prohibits 
States from expelling or returning a refugee “to the frontiers of territo-
ries where his life or freedom would be threatened.”27 While each rati-
fying State retains the right to make reservations as to the terms of the 
agreement, the fundamental provisions concerning the definition of a 
refugee and the principle that no refugee will be returned to a territory 
where he or she fears persecution cannot be reserved.28 In 1967, the 
United Nations expanded the scope of protection to include individu-
als who became refugees after 1951 by passing the Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees (1967 Protocol).29 Currently, one hundred and 
forty-three States have ratified each of the agreements.30 Although the 
United States was not a signatory to the 1951 Convention, it eventually 
accepted its basic tenets when it signed the 1967 Protocol.31 
 For a nation made up almost entirely of immigrants, the United 
States has struggled throughout its legislative history to define consis-
tent, fair immigration policies.32 In 1965, Congress passed a new Immi-
gration Act that allowed widespread immigration by people from 
around the world which altered the composition and size of the immi-
grant population.33 Three years after the passage of that Act, the 
United States signed the 1967 Protocol and, in doing so, accepted re-
sponsibility for refugees under the newly broadened definition.34 Na-
tions, like the United States, that had not ratified the 1951 Convention 
but signed the 1967 Protocol, accepted de facto the basic principles of 
the 1951 Convention.35 By signing the 1967 Protocol, the United States 
assumed responsibility for coordinating with other nations in the pro-
tection of refugees throughout the world.36 Congress essentially codi-
fied the internationally accepted definition of a refugee when it passed 
                                                                                                                      
26 Id. art. 26. 
27 Id. art. 33. 
28 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. 42. 
29 1967 Protocol, supra note 20, art. 1. 
30 UNCHR, Parties to Convention, supra note 12, at 1. 
31 Id.; see 1967 Protocol, supra note 20, art. 1. 
32 See Phillip G. Schrag, A Well-Founded Fear: The Congressional Battle to 
Save Political Asylum in America 2 (2000); Theresa Sidebothom, Immigration Policies 
and the War on Terrorism, 32 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 539, 542 (2004). 
33 García, supra note 2, at 85. 
34 UNHCR, Parties to Convention, supra note 12, at 4. 
35 See 1967 Protocol, supra note 20, art. 1. Given that the 1967 Protocol incorporated 
the basic principles of the 1951 Convention, from this point forward all references to the 
1967 Protocol are intended to be inclusive of the common principles between the agree-
ments. Alternate usages will be noted as such. 
36 Id. 
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the Refugee Act of 1980.37 The Act, as subsequently interpreted, 
changed the U.S. standard for accepting refugees from a “clear prob-
ability” of persecution to a “well-founded fear” of persecution in accor-
dance with the language of the 1967 Protocol.38 
 These expanded allowances for immigrants and refugees were fol-
lowed by the election of President Reagan and economic recession.39 
During the 1980s and 1990s, new immigration statutes and policies 
were implemented that reflected these political and economic shifts.40 
Unequal implementation of refugee policies quietly eroded opportuni-
ties for the most vulnerable.41 As a result of these politically motivated 
policies, the United States failed to fully implement the provisions of 
the 1967 Protocol and the 1980 Refugee Act and, therefore, did not 
meet its obligations under international or domestic law.42 
B. U.S. Response to Central American Migrants 
 While facially neutral, U.S. refugee policy during the 1980s gave 
preference to applicants from Communist countries while denying pro-
tection to those fleeing regimes the United States was supporting.43 For 
example, by 1987, nearly one million migrants from Guatemala, Nicara-
gua, and El Salvador had arrived in the United States in need of a safe 
                                                                                                                      
37 Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 420 (1984); García, su-
pra note 2, at 87. 
38 Francis Gabor & John B. Rosenquest, The Unsettled Status of Economic Refugees from the 
American and International Legal Perspectives—A Proposal for Recognition Under Existing Interna-
tional Law, 41 Tex. Int’l L.J. 275, 279 (2006); see Stevic, 467 U.S. at 424. 
39 García, supra note 2, at 85–86. 
40 Id. at 86. For example, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 attempted 
to control illegal immigration by punishing employers who gave work to illegal immi-
grants. Gabor & Rosenquest, supra note 38, at 279. 
41 See García, supra note 2, at 89. The State Department has discretionary authority to 
grant a special, temporary status (Extended Voluntary Departure) to citizens of another 
country whose lives might be jeopardized by returning to their country of origin; this 
status was not assigned to Central Americans during the 1980s. See id. See generally Lynda J. 
Oswald, Extended Voluntary Departure Limiting the Attorney General’s Discretion in Immigration 
Matters, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 152 (1986) (examining the denial of Extended Voluntary Depar-
ture to Salvadorans). Extended Voluntary Departure has been granted to citizens of at 
least fourteen nations including Cubans, Vietnamese, Iranians, Ethiopians, Afghans, 
Ugandans, and Poles. García, supra note 2, at 89. However, it was not assigned to Central 
Americans during the 1980s because the Reagan administration argued that the violence 
was not substantial enough, that there were sufficient avenues for refugees to seek protec-
tion, that the massive numbers of potential petitioners made it administratively impossible, 
and that providing a blanket protection would encourage additional unwanted migration. 
See id. at 89–90. 
42 García, supra note 2, at 87, 99. 
43 See id. at 88, 89. 
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haven from direct persecution and on-going violence in their home 
countries.44 A very small percentage of these migrants were granted 
immigration visas or refugee status.45 Generally, the United States 
viewed these and other migrants from Central America “as yet another 
drain” on a “fragile economy” and therefore treated them as unwelcome 
intruders.46 Furthermore, the Reagan administration argued that con-
tainment of Communism in Central America required the establish-
ment of economic stability and that discouraging migration from Cen-
tral America, especially into the United States, would create stability and 
foster democracy.47 
 U.S. foreign and humanitarian policies towards Central America 
were compromised by the primary objective of containing Communism 
and establishing democracy in the region.48 Although the Refugee Act 
of 1980 formally adopted the 1967 Protocol’s definition of a refugee 
and attempted to standardize the process of applying for refugee status, 
the majority of those receiving refugee status throughout the 1980s 
continued to come from Communist countries.49 The United States’ 
                                                                                                                      
44 See id. at 85. 
45 See id. This Book Review focuses primarily on those individuals with refugee status. 
However, there is a statutory distinction between those seeking an immigration visa and 
those seeking refugee status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). When an indi-
vidual applies for an immigrant visa, he seeks permission to enter the United States with 
the intention of applying for permanent residence status. See id. § 1151(a). There are 
twenty categories of aliens who do not seek permanent resident status and are not defined 
as immigrants; they include representatives of other nations, those traveling temporarily 
for business or pleasure, and students. Id. § 1101(a). All other aliens are considered immi-
grants. See id. In contrast, the definition of a refugee is based on the individual’s physical 
location and reason for being outside of their country. See id. A refugee becomes eligible 
to apply for permanent residence after being physically present in the United States for 
one year. Id. § 1159(a)(1). 
46 See García, supra note 2, at 85–86. 
47 See id. at 86. In addition to denying refuge, the United States sought to discourage 
migration of any kind out of Central America by providing substantial development aid 
and funds to assist people in the region. See id. Between 1984 and 1989 the United States 
provided over $5 billion in development aid to the Central American countries of Guate-
mala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Belize, and Honduras. See id. In addition, the United States 
contributed over $100 million to the UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red 
Cross for their work with displaced Central Americans. Id. at 86–87. The political purpose 
of these seemingly generous aid programs is clear in U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs 
Jonathan Moore’s description of the purpose of the expenditures: “to support the return 
of economic stability to the region, to establish the foundation for broad-based sustained 
growth, and to encourage the growth of democracy and democratic institutions.” Jonathan 
Moore, Developing Solutions for Central American Refugee Problems, 89 Dep’t St. Bull., Aug. 
1989, at 87. 
48 See García, supra note 2, at 1–2, 9. 
49 Id. at 87–88. By 1990, more than ninety percent of individuals granted refugee status 
were from Communist or Communist-dominated countries. Id. at 88. 
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political agenda led the country to condemn Communist countries 
known to persecute their citizens while failing to acknowledge that 
many of the regimes it supported were also persecuting their citizens.50 
The inconsistency of this policy was noted by activist William Sloane 
Coffin: 
Were the U.S. government today forcibly returning Soviet 
Jews to the Soviet Union, or Poles to Poland, neither the Con-
gress nor the American people would stand for it. . . . Why do 
they tolerate the forceful repatriation of Guatemalans to a 
government widely viewed as the most brutal in the entire 
Western hemisphere?51 
 Article III of the 1951 Convention requires that States not consider 
national origin in the granting of refugee status.52 The United States 
voluntarily accepted an obligation to uphold this Article by agreeing to 
the 1967 Protocol and adopting the Refugee Act of 1980.53 Yet, to the 
detriment of thousands of Central Americans, the country disregarded 
its commitment under international law and regularly considered na-
tional origin in determining which persecuted people to protect.54 In 
1985, eighty religious and refugee assistance groups challenged this 
unwritten policy in a class action lawsuit that aimed to secure asylum for 
Guatemalans and Salvadorans.55 Six years later, a settlement agreement 
with the federal government prohibited those making refugee deci-
sions from considering a petitioner’s country of origin or whether the 
United States supported or had a favorable relationship with that coun-
try in deciding whether the petitioner had a well-founded fear of per-
                                                                                                                      
50 See id. at 10. U.S. relations with Nicaragua in the mid-1980s provide a good example 
of simultaneous shifts in refugee and foreign policy. See id. at 114. In 1985, the United 
States increased support for the Contras’ efforts against the Sandinista government as it 
began responding to the refugee needs of Nicaraguans. Id. As President Reagan asked 
Congress for more money for the Contras, the Director of the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service in southern Florida announced that he would no longer reject Nicaraguans’ 
asylum claims: “It is agonizing to have to reject their applications because their asylum 
claims under present regulations are very hard to prove. Nicaraguans are fleeing Commu-
nism.” Id. 
51 See id. at 96 (quoting William Sloane Coffin, The Task Ahead, in Sanctuary: A Re-
source Guide for Understanding and Participating in the Central American 
Refugee’s Struggle 177, 177(Gary MacEoin ed., 1985)). 
52 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. 3. 
53 Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424 (1984); see 1967 Pro-
tocol, supra note 20, art. 1. 
54 See García, supra note 2, at 162. 
55 See Am. Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796, 799 (N.D. Cal. 1991); 
García, supra note 2, at 111. 
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secution.56 The specificity with which the settlement articulated this 
rule suggests that the court found the government’s unwritten policy 
exceptionally problematic: 
WHEREAS, under the new asylum regulations as well as the 
old: foreign policy and border enforcement considerations 
are not relevant to the determination of whether an applicant 
for asylum has a well-founded fear of persecution; the fact that 
an individual is from a country whose government the United 
States supports or with which it has favorable relations is not 
relevant to the determination of whether an applicant for asy-
lum has a well-founded fear of persecution; whether or not 
the United States Government agrees with the political or 
ideological beliefs of the individual is not relevant to the de-
termination of whether an applicant for asylum has a well-
founded fear of persecution; the same standard for determin-
ing whether or not an applicant has a well-founded fear of 
persecution applies to Salvadorans and Guatemalans as ap-
plies to all other nationalities . . . .57 
As a result of this settlement, more than 150,000 Salvadorans and Gua-
temalans who were in the United States had the opportunity to reapply 
for refugee status.58 Unfortunately, this decision could not protect the 
thousands of Salvadorans and Guatemalans who had been denied refu-
gee status and were deported back to their country of origin.59 
 That the United States did not provide refuge for these Central 
Americans was a humanitarian failure driven by foreign policy con-
cerns.60 The costs of these policies were borne by the overwhelming 
majority of refugees who sought and were not given safe haven.61 De-
spite pledging in the 1967 Protocol to protect those seeking refuge 
from well-founded fears of persecution, the United States instead 
                                                                                                                      
56 Am. Baptist Churches, 760 F. Supp. at 799. In February 2005, the U.S. Commission on 
Religious Freedom reported that the probability of receiving asylum still depended heavily 
on the claimant’s country of origin. See García, supra note 2, at 162. For example, at that 
time a person seeking asylum from El Salvador had a six percent chance of being granted 
asylum while a Cuban had an eighty percent chance. Id. 
57 Am. Baptist Churches, 760 F. Supp. at 799. 
58 See García, supra note 2, at 112. 
59Am. Baptist Churches, 760 F. Supp. at 799. A mere 2.6% of Salvadoran and 1.8% of 
Guatemalan applications for asylum were accepted between 1983 and 1990. García, supra 
note 2, at 113. In a telling contrast, 76.7% of those seeking asylum from the Soviet Union 
were accepted. See id. 
60 See García, supra note 2, at 10, 88–89. 
61 See id. at 90. 
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placed the burden of its foreign policy priorities directly upon the most 
vulnerable.62 
II. Taking the Same Path in the Middle East? 
The American invasion and the lack of a coherent strategy to ensure the 
safety of Iraqi citizens and rebuild post-invasion Iraq are the root cause of 
Iraqi suffering. The United States is, therefore, to blame, and as Iraqis are 
obviously fleeing from political persecution, the honorable thing to do is for 
President Bush to grant these Iraqis asylum in the United States! 63 
 
 The failure of U.S. policy towards Central America in the 1980s 
should serve as a warning of the risks of imposing democracy, support-
ing alternating regimes, and failing to provide adequate responses to 
humanitarian need.64 Instead, the United States has taken a very simi-
lar path in Iraq and risks many of the same humanitarian failures.65 As 
it did with Central America, the United States initially supported a re-
gime that it later worked to dismantle.66 The invasion of Iraq; the cap-
                                                                                                                      
62 See id.; 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. 1; 1967 Protocol, supra note 20, art. 1. 
63 Brant Thomas, Letter to the Editor, Asylum for Iraqis, N.Y. Times, May 22, 2006, at 
A20. 
64 See García, supra note 2, at 8, 14–15. 
65 See Robert Buzzanco, How Did Iraq and the United States Become Enemies?, George Mason 
U. Hist. News Network, Oct. 28, 2002, http://hnn.us/articles/1066.html; Refugees Int’l, 
Iraqi Refugees in Syria: Silent Exodus Leaves 500,000 in Need of Protection and Aid, Nov. 15, 2005, 
http://www.refintl.org/content/article/detail/7297/ [hereinafter Refugees Int’l, Iraqi Refu-
gees in Syria]; Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, ICRC Activities in Iraq: April to June 2006, 
June 30, 2006, http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/iraq-update-300606 (“Daily 
acts of violence that violate the basic rules of international humanitarian law have unfortu-
nately become a feature of life in Iraq, with civilians continuing to die as a result of indis-
criminate attacks, targeted assassinations and military operations.”). Although the number of 
Iraqis who have sought refuge in the United States is small in comparison to the massive 
number of Central Americans who did so in the 1980s, U.S. responsibility under the 1967 
Protocol to address the refugees’ needs at home and abroad is just as imperative. See 1951 
Convention, supra note 1, pmbl.; 1967 Protocol, supra note 20, art. 1. 
66 See Buzzanco, supra note 65. As early as 1955, the United States made strategic alli-
ances with Iraq and other Middle Eastern countries in an effort to contain Communism 
through an agreement called the “Baghdad Pact,” which set terms for coordinating re-
gional affairs. Id. In 1958, a nationalist coup forced pro-American King Faisal out of power 
leading to the dissolution of the Baghdad Pact and a takeover over by Gen. Abdel Karim 
Kassim. Id. Repression of Saddam Hussein and other leaders of the Iraqi Left under Kas-
sim ended when Kassim was assassinated in a coup led by the Ba’ath Party in 1963. Id. The 
Ba’ath party received intelligence support from the United States during the following five 
years, leading eventually to the Ba’aths, including member Saddam Hussein, taking power. 
Id. The United States brokered an agreement to harden the border between Iraq and Tur-
key in 1975 which lead to the mass murder of Kurdish rebels in the northern region of 
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ture, trial, and execution of Saddam Hussein; and the attempts to es-
tablish interim democratic governments have all been accompanied by 
massive civilian death and displacement.67 The primary justifications 
for the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq have been the pursuit of terrorists, the 
need for preventative warfare, and the belief that “democracy is a nec-
essary and lacking institution in the Middle East that will keep the West 
safe from terrorism.”68 The argument that forcing the establishment of 
democracy will create stability and stave off a contrary force, whether it 
be Communism or terrorism, is not new and has not been proven to be 
correct.69 Between the March 2003 U.S.-led invasion and September 
2006, as many as 600,000 Iraqi civilians were killed and nearly 900,000 
                                                                                                                      
Iraq. Id. During the 1980s, the United States and Iraq jointly opposed the Islamic Revolu-
tion in Iran. Id. In that decade, the United States provided Saddam Hussein’s government 
with over $40 billion in weapons and technology intended for use in fighting Iran, in addi-
tion to significant economic aid. Id. In August 1990, Iraq invaded its neighboring country 
of Kuwait in an effort to control oil exports in the region. See id. Following a warning to 
retreat by the United States and Great Britain, U.S. troops initiated air and ground attacks 
and forced the retreat of the Iraqi military from Kuwait. Id. During the 1990s, the United 
States and United Nations placed sanctions on Iraq in order to instigate regime change 
which, according to some human rights groups, led to disastrous health conditions and 
close to one million deaths. Id. As it had done in Nicaragua, the United States then began 
supporting groups that opposed the leader it had previously helped to install. See News-
Hour: Opposing Saddam (PBS television broadcast Aug. 8, 2002), available at http://www. 
pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/july-dec02/opposition_8-8.html#. Following the at-
tacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration began planning an invasion of Iraq 
as a key facet of the “War on Terror.” See Seymour M. Hersh, The Stovepipe; How Conflicts 
Between the Bush Administration and the Intelligence Community Marred the Reporting on Iraq’s 
Weapons, New Yorker, Oct. 27, 2003, at 77. In March 2003, U.S.-led forces invaded Iraq 
under the pretext of Iraq’s refusal to provide information about its presumptive develop-
ment of weapons of mass destruction. See Kevin J. Fandl, Recalibrating the War on Terror by 
Enhancing Development Practices in the Middle East, 16 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 299, 300 
(2006); President George W. Bush, President Bush Addresses the Nation (March 19, 2003), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html. In May 
2003, President Bush declared that, “[i]n the battle of Iraq, the United States and our 
allies have prevailed. . . . [T]he tyrant has fallen, and Iraq is free.” President George W. 
Bush, President Bush Announces Major Combat Operations in Iraq Have Ended (May 1, 
2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030501-15.html. 
67 See Gilbert Burnham et al., Mortality After the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: A Cross-Sectional Clus-
ter Sample Survey, 368 The Lancet 1421, 1421 (2006), available at http://www. thelancet. 
com/webfiles/images/journals/lancet/s0140673606694919.pdf. The controversial Lancet 
study estimates that over 650,000 people may have died between March 2003 and Septem-
ber 2006 as a result of the war. Id. That figure includes approximately 100,000 people who 
died between March 2003 and September 2004. Id. As such, it is possible that as many as 
550,000 people died between September 2004 and September 2006. Id. 
68 See Fandl, supra note 66, at 310, 324. 
69 See id. at 317–18. 
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sought refuge outside of Iraq.70 The Iraq Study Group, a bi-partisan 
initiative to reassess the situation in Iraq, noted the risk of not address-
ing the refugee crisis: “The number of refugees and internally displaced 
persons within Iraq is increasing dramatically. If this situation is not ad-
dressed, Iraq and the region could be further destabilized, and the 
humanitarian suffering could be severe.”71 
 These refugees have primarily sought safety in the neighboring 
countries of Syria and Jordan.72 Substantial numbers of Iraqi refugees 
have also gone to Australia, Denmark, Germany, Iran, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.73 All of 
these counties, save Norway, exceeded the United States in their accep-
tance of Iraqi refugees.74 While geography and the ease of travel play a 
role in where persecuted peoples seek refuge, the relatively low num-
ber of Iraqi refugees in the United States can partially be attributed to 
an overall drop in the number of refugees accepted into the United 
States following the attacks of September 11, 2001.75 
                                                                                                                      
70 See Burnham, supra note 67, at 1421; Tavernise, supra note 3. Estimates of the num-
ber of Iraqis who have sought refuge outside of Iraq vary widely. See Burnham, supra note 
67, at 1421; Tavernise, supra note 3; UNHCR, Global Refugee Trends, supra note 3, at tbl.2. 
Even conservative estimates, such as that of the UNHCR, suggest that by the end of 2005 
there were approximately 260,000 Iraqi refugees. See UNHCR, Global Refugee Trends, supra 
note 3, at tbl.2. The disparity likely derives from the methods used to assess the number of 
refugees and the definition of refugee being applied. See Tavernise, supra note 3. 
71 James A. Baker, III et al., The Iraq Study Group Report 58, 103 (2006). 
72 See Tavernise, supra note 3. The U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants esti-
mated that there were 644,500 Iraqi refugees in Syria and Jordan at the end of 2005. Id. 
Syria has the most open border policies, granting Iraqis fleeing their home country per-
mission to remain legally in Syria as a temporary resident for up to six months. See Refu-
gees Int’l, Iraqi Refugees in Syria, supra note 65. 
73 See UNHCR, Global Refugee Trends, supra note 3, at tbl.5. 
74 Id. According to the UNHCR, the Iraqi refugee population in the United States as of 
June 2, 2006 was 9150, compared to 93,173 in Iran, 68,071 in Germany, 27,622 in the 
Netherlands, 22,763 in the United Kingdom, 22,028 in Sweden, 11,500 in Denmark, 
11,471 in Australia, and 8265 in Norway. Id. 
75 Donald Kerwin, The Use and Misuse of “National Security” Rationale in Crafting U.S. 
Refugee and Immigration Policies, 17 Int’l J. Refugee L. 749, 756 (2005). Between 1999 and 
2001 the United States admitted an average of just over 75,000 refugees per year; in con-
trast, the average during the following three years was approximately 36,000. See id. One 
post-September 11th reduction of refugee allowances occurred when the Bush administra-
tion immediately suspended refugee resettlement programs, leaving thousands of refugees 
in refugee camps. See Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, The W Visa: A Legislative Proposal for Female 
and Child Refugees Trapped in a Post-September 11 World, 17 Yale J.L. & Feminism 459, 478 
(2005). Historically, the United States has accepted more refugees for permanent reset-
tlement than other countries. Id. at 471. This impetuous policy change is particularly 
alarming in light of the fact that no terrorist in U.S. history, including the September 11th 
terrorists, entered the country under the refugee resettlement program. See Marisa Silenzi 
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 Congress made seeking refuge significantly more difficult by pass-
ing the REAL ID Act of 2005.76 This Act made major changes in the 
proof an individual requesting refugee status must provide and the 
qualifications for refugee status.77 The Act imposes a new burden of 
proof on an individual to demonstrate that “race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will 
be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.”78 Instead 
of requiring that an applicant prove a well-founded fear of persecution, 
the Act now places an exceptionally high burden on refugee applicants 
to prove the actual reason for their persecution.79 In effect, the Act 
changes the definition of a refugee from someone who can prove that 
they have a legitimate fear of persecution to someone who can prove 
the motives of their persecutors.80 Changing the definition of a refugee 
or the statutory criteria for obtaining refugee status may be an altera-
tion of an unreservable provision of the 1951 Convention.81 As such, 
the change stands in direct conflict with the United States’ commit-
ment under the 1967 Protocol.82 
 In addition, the Act prohibits those who know or should have 
known that their actions afforded material support to a terrorist or-
                                                                                                                      
Cianciarulo, Terrorism and Asylum Seekers: Why the REAL ID Act Is a False Promise, 43 Harv. J. 
on Legis. 101, 104 (2006)[hereinafter Cianciarulo, Terrorism and Asylum Seekers]. 
76 See 8 U.S.C.A § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (West 2005) (changing the requirement from a 
“well-founded fear of persecution”); Kerwin, supra note 75, at 757. 
77 Cianciarulo, Terrorism and Asylum Seekers, supra note 75, at 115–16; see Eleanor Acer, 
Refuge in an Insecure Time, Seeking Asylum in the Post 9/11 United States, 28 Fordham Int’l 
L.J. 1361, 1393–94 (2005). 
78 8 U.S.C.A § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). Cianciarulo has argued that interpretation of the 
REAL ID Act should preserve the Supreme Court’s declaration in Immigration & Naturali-
zation Service v. Elias-Zacarias that eligibility for asylum should not depend on “direct proof 
of [the] persecutors’ motives.” See 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992); Cianciarulo, Terrorism and 
Asylum Seekers, supra note 75, at 120. 
79 See Letter from American Bar Association Governmental Affairs Office to Congres-
sional Representatives, (Feb. 9, 2005) available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/ 
109th/immigration020905.pdf [hereinafter ABA Letter]. In opposing this provision of the 
Act, the ABA argued that it would “present nearly insurmountable obstacles for genuine 
refugees,” because “[p]lacing the additional burden on asylum seekers of not only having 
to establish why another person took certain actions, but the degree to which that person 
was motivated by a particular reason to the exclusion of others, is an extreme and unat-
tainable standard of proof.” Id. 
80 See 8 U.S.C.A § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (West 2005); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b) 
(2004). 
81 See 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. 42; UNHCR, Intro. to Convention & Pro-
tocol, supra note 1, at 5. 
82 See 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. 42; UNHCR, Intro. to Convention & Pro-
tocol, supra note 1, at 5. 
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ganization or its members from applying for refuge.83 This requirement 
denies protection to those in the greatest need, particularly those peo-
ple “who have taken up arms in resistance, in self-defense against such 
violent forces, as well as for those who have provided financial support, 
food, or clothing to others engaged in resistance.”84 Supporters of the 
Act justify its hurdles by citing national security concerns; a justification 
that many have argued is invalid.85 Even some organizations that gen-
erally support the REAL ID Act have objected strongly to this provi-
sion.86 Gary Bauer, the president of the conservative public policy 
group American Values, described the enforcement of the REAL ID Act 
as having lapsed “into ludicrousy,” as he explained that “[t]he concept 
of material support is being distorted and even the definition of the 
term ‘terrorism’ is being turned on its ear.”87 
                                                                                                                      
83 See 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(v), 1182(a)(3)(B) (West 2005). Much has been writ-
ten about the implications of these exclusions on refuge seekers who have been forced by 
terrorist groups to participate in or support terrorist activities and, therefore, to commit 
crimes against peace or humanity. See generally, e.g., Michele L. Lombardo et al., Terrorism, 
Material Support, the Inherent Right to Self-Defense, and the U.S. Obligation to Protect Legitimate Asy-
lum Seekers in a Post-9/11, Post-PATRIOT Act, Post-REAL ID Act World, 4 Regent J. Int’l L. 237 
(2006). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 was the first U.S. act to 
explicitly bar “providing material support or resources” to “foreign terrorist organizations.” 
See 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (1994 & Supp. II 1996); Lombardo et al., supra, at 239. This prohibition 
has been widely criticized for failing to provide an exception for refugees who have been 
forced to make payments to or provide shelter to terrorist groups. See Amnesty Int’l, USA: 
Amnesty International Briefing to the Human Rights Committee on the Implementation of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, at 60, AI Index AMR 51/111/2006, July 2006, 
available at 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/AMR511112006ENGLISH/$File/AMR5111106.pdf 
[hereinafter Amnesty Int’l, Civil and Political Rights]. An example of the implementation of 
this provision is found in the unpublished decision in Arias v. Gonzales, 143 F. App’x 464, 
468 (3d Cir. 2005). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that a Columbian man who 
fearfully made payments on his boss’s behalf to a violent paramilitary group had provided 
material support to a terrorist organization and was therefore inadmissible. See id. 
84 See Lombardo et al., supra note 83, at 238. 
85 See Cianciarulo, Terrorism and Asylum Seekers, supra note 75, at 101–02. While arguing 
for the passage of the REAL ID Act, Rep. James Sensenbrenner (R-Wis.), its author, re-
ferred to four non-citizen terrorists and stated that “[e]very one of these non-9/11 terror-
ists who tried to kill or did kill honest, law-abiding Americans was an asylum applicant.” See 
id. In fact, all four of the men he referred to were denied asylum under a more permissive 
asylum policy. See id. at 105. Furthermore, the Act does not specifically target possible ter-
rorists, but instead affects all refugee applicants. See id. at 103; see also Kerwin, supra note 
75, at 757–58 (describing how post-9/11 legislation intended to increase national security 
has undermined refugee protections). 
86 Darryl Fears, Conservatives Decry Terror Laws’ Impact on Refugees, Wash. Post, Jan. 8, 
2007, at A3. 
87 Id. 
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 According to the American Bar Association, the possibility that the 
Act will deny protection to bona fide refugees is “inconsistent with Amer-
ica’s role as a champion of human rights and threatens [the country’s] 
longstanding commitment to the protection of those fleeing persecution 
throughout the world.”88 By passing the REAL ID Act, Congress disre-
garded the country’s obligations under the 1967 Protocol.89 
III. Suggestions for Fulfilling International  
Refugee Obligations 
 In the 1980s, activists opposed to U.S. involvement in Central Amer-
ica and to the unequal application of statutory protections for refugees 
argued that humanitarian policy needed to align more closely to for-
eign policy to ensure the safety of millions of persecuted migrants.90 
They identified an inconsistency in contributing to violence and up-
heaval that drove millions from their homes without providing suffi-
cient refuge for dislocated victims of persecution.91 The same argument 
has been made regarding the U.S. involvement in Iraq, perhaps with 
even greater force due to the fact that the United States has invaded 
and occupied Iraq.92 Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) expressed this 
sense of responsibility: “The refugees are witnesses to the cruelty that 
stains our age, and they cannot be overlooked. America bears heavy 
responsibility for their plight. We have a clear obligation to stop ignor-
ing it and help chart a sensible course to ease the refugee crisis. Time is 
not on our side.”93 
 However, the United States’ obligation to provide humanitarian 
relief for Iraqis should not and does not depend upon its role in the 
war.94 Under the 1967 Protocol, the United States agreed to work with 
other States to provide refuge for persons with a “well-founded fear of 
                                                                                                                      
88 ABA Letter, supra note 79, at 4. 
89 See Amnesty Int’l, Civil and Political Rights, supra note 83, at 60. Amnesty Interna-
tional has also raised concerns that other pending legislation will further undermine the 
United States’ commitment to international obligations because it would “erode due proc-
ess for non-citizens” and “criminalize all violations of immigration law.” See id. 
90 See García, supra note 2, at 92. 
91 See id. 
92 See Thomas, supra note 63; Refugees Int’l, U.S. Unprepared for Humanitarian Obliga-
tions of Iraq Occupation, Mar. 10, 2003, available at http://www.refintl.org/content/article/ 
detail/845 (explaining that under the Fourth Geneva Convention a country that invades 
and conquers another takes on specific humanitarian obligations for the civilian popula-
tion). 
93 Edward M. Kennedy, Editorial, We Can’t Ignore Iraq’s Refugees, Wash. Post, Dec. 30, 
2006, at A21. 
94 See 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. 1; 1967 Protocol, supra note 20, art.1. 
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persecution.”95 Article III of the 1967 Protocol requires that States in-
form the United Nations of the “laws and regulations they may adopt to 
ensure the application” of the agreement.96 The Refugee Act of 1980 
should have ensured the application of the 1967 Protocol; instead, it 
was implemented in a discriminatory manner when distinctions based 
on national origin affected the acceptance of refugee applications.97 As 
a result, the United States failed to meet the standards established by 
the 1967 Protocol.98 
 While the federal courts addressed and attempted to remedy this 
situation in the 1980s, the passage of the REAL ID Act of 2005 codified 
the United States’ defiance of its obligations under the 1967 Protocol.99 
The United States should acknowledge and act upon its voluntarily ac-
cepted obligation by immediately amending the portions of the REAL 
ID Act that distort the definition of a refugee.100 Congress should re-
peal the new burden of proof placed on a refugee applicant to prove 
the reason for his or her persecution.101 In addition, the material sup-
port provision of the REAL ID Act should be amended to clarify that 
the bar only applies to those individuals who pose a danger to the 
United States and that having provided support under duress or op-
pression is a defense against this bar.102 
 In order to fulfill its commitment under the 1967 Protocol, the 
United States must not only reform the REAL ID Act, but also must 
adopt policies that conform to international law and provide resources 
to respond to the urgent needs of persecuted Iraqis.103 Although the 
                                                                                                                      
95 See 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. 1; 1967 Protocol, supra note 20, art.1. 
96 See 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. 1; 1967 Protocol, supra note 20, art.1. 
97 See García, supra note 2, at 11–12. 
98 See 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. 1; 1967 Protocol, supra note 20, art.1. 
99 See Am. Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796, 799 (N.D. Cal. 1991); 
ABA Letter, supra note 79. 
100 See Cianciarulo, Terrorism and Asylum Seekers, supra note 75, at 120; ABA Letter, supra 
note 79. 
101 See Cianciarulo, Terrorism and Asylum Seekers, supra note 75, at 120; ABA Letter, supra 
note 79. 
102 Eleanor Acer et al., Human Rights First, Abandoning the Persecuted: Vic-
tims of Terrorism & Oppression Barred From Asylum 11–12 (2006), http://www.hu- 
manrightsfirst.info/pdf/06925-asy-abandon-persecuted.pdf. In January 2007, the Bush 
administration announced that it would no longer apply the material support bar to indi-
viduals with connections to specific terrorist groups in Burma, Cuba, Tibet, and Myanmar. 
See Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Security, Intention to Use Discretionary Authority 
for Material Support to Terrorism ( Jan. 19, 2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/ 
releases/pr_1169465766808.shtm; Human Rights First, Material Support Update 1 
(2007), http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/07125-asy-matl-sup-update.pdf. 
103 See 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. 1; 1967 Protocol, supra note 20, art.1. 
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number of Iraqi refugees in the United States may remain relatively 
low, the country has an obligation to work with other States to protect 
refugees.104 The preamble to the 1951 Convention explained that “the 
grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, 
and that a satisfactory solution of a problem [with an] international 
scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved without international 
co-operation.”105 As such, the United States should continue to increase 
contributions to refugee organizations such as the UNHCR and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross to provide for the basic 
health, shelter, and education needs of Iraqi refugees throughout the 
world.106 In 2006, the United States contributed approximately $8 mil-
lion to the UNHCR’s efforts in Iraq, which constituted more than half 
of the total contributions worldwide.107 The UNHCR has stated that it 
will need almost $60 million to help Iraqi refugees in 2007.108 In Feb-
ruary 2007, the United States agreed to provide $18 million of the 
needed $60 million.109 While this is a significant increase in actual 
funds, it does not represent an increase that is proportional to the ex-
pected need.110 
 Additional steps the United States could take include using diplo-
matic force to influence the actions of other countries in augmenting 
                                                                                                                      
104 See 1951 Convention, supra note 1, art. 1; 1967 Protocol, supra note 20, art.1.; 
UNHCR, Global Refugee Trends, supra note 3, at tbl.5. In February 2007, the Bush admini-
stration announced that it will allow 7000 Iraqi refugees to resettle in the United States. 
Nora Boustany & Joshua Partlow, U.S. Agrees to Resettle Refugees from Iraq, Wash. Post, Feb. 
15, 2007, at A22. This will be a fourteen-fold increase over the number of Iraqi refugees 
currently resettled in the United States. See id. 
105 See 1951 Convention, supra note 1, pmbl. 
106 See Refugees Int’l, Iraqi Refugees in Syria, supra note 65, at 2. Similar emergency hu-
manitarian funds were allocated by President Bush for the protection of Afghan refugees 
in September 2001. See Exec. Determination No. 2001-30, 66 Fed. Reg. 51,291 (Oct. 9, 
2001). There is a telling contrast between the $250 billion the United States had spent in 
Iraq by April 2006 and the mere $5 billion that the U.S. Agency for International Devel-
opment had spent there as of November 2006. Paying for Iraq: Blood and Treasure, Econo-
mist, Apr. 8, 2006, at 81; U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., Summary Iraq Humanitarian and 
Reconstruction Assistance Financial Summary 3 (2006), http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/ 
updates/nov06/iraq_sum01_110106.pdf. 
107 UNHCR, Supplementary Appeal Iraq Situation Response 12 ( Jan. 2007), http:// 
www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/opendoc.pdf?tbl=SUBSITES&id=45a4a2472. The 
total cost of UNHCR expenses in 2006 totaled approximately $30 million, about $9 million of 
this was covered by funds carried over from 2005. Id. 
108 Id. at 11. 
109 Boustany & Partlow, supra note 104. 
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the protected statuses available to Iraqis.111 The United States should 
use its diplomatic power to condemn countries that force Iraqi refugees 
to return to Iraq before “sufficient guarantees are in place to ensure 
that their return is safe and dignified.”112 By doing so, the United States 
will uphold the 1951 Convention’s prohibition against the return of 
refugees if their lives or freedom will be threatened.113 Looking beyond 
the basic requirements of the 1967 Protocol, the United States might 
follow the lead of many European countries by creating alternative pro-
tections for Iraqis who have not qualified for refugee status.114 For ex-
ample, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Belgium have all granted 
subsidiary forms of protection or indefinitely extended deportation 
deadlines for Iraqis whose refugee applications have been denied.115 
Conclusion 
 In Seeking Refuge: Central American Migration to Mexico, the United 
States, and Canada, María Cristina García articulates the 1980s activist 
argument that the United States had a moral and legal obligation to 
provide refuge for Central American refugees.116 The country’s legal 
obligation originated in its joining the 1967 Protocol and was codified 
in domestic law through the passage and interpretation of the Refugee 
Act of 1980.117 Without addressing the moral issue of whether involve-
ment in the upheaval that led to mass migration from Central America 
created an additional moral obligation, this Book Review argues that 
the international legal obligation alone demanded consistent, fair ap-
plication of refugee policy. Through their protest, civil disobedience, 
lobbying, and legal efforts, activists drew attention to the fact that unof-
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ficial U.S. policy failed to comply with international and domestic 
law.118 
 The U.S.-led war in Iraq has created hundreds of thousands of 
refugees.119 As it was in the 1980s, the United States is now faced with 
responding to a refugee crisis that it had a hand in creating. In the 
1980s the country discriminatorily implemented laws that complied 
with international law; the United States has now gone beyond its past 
abrogation by passing the REAL ID Act of 2005, which substantially ne-
gates the essential principle that a person with a “well-founded fear of 
persecution” will be protected as a refugee.120 In order to fulfill its legal 
duty under the 1967 Protocol, the United States must amend the por-
tions of the REAL ID Act that contradict its international obligations 
and act definitively to provide the resources and support that Iraqi 
refugees require. 
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